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Abstract
We give a logic for formulas φ−◦ψ , with the informal reading “ψ is true in the context described
by φ”. These are interpreted as binary modalities, by quantification over an enumerable set of unary
modalities c−◦ψ , meaning “ψ is true in context c”. The logic allows arbitrary nesting of contexts.
A corresponding axiomatic presentation is given, and proven to be decidable, sound, and complete.
Previously, quantificational logic of context restricted the nesting of contexts, and was only known
to be decidable in very special cases.
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1. Introduction
The need for formal systems of reasoning within given contexts, and for migrating be-
tween contexts, was pointed out in [6,12,13]. See [2,3,5,14,15,17] for some developments
of logical systems in this area.
An well-known application of a formal system of context is to localized contexts in the
Cyc knowledge base [16]. During the early phases of the Cyc project [7] introduced the
notation ist(c,ψ), with the reading that “ψ is true in context c”.
We use the notation c −◦ ψ for this, and generalize by allowing formulas in the first
coordinate: φ −◦ ψ . We give formal semantics corresponding to the informal reading of
φ −◦ψ as “ψ is true in the context described by φ”.
This paper is organized as follows: The formula language is defined in the next section,
and some examples are given that illustrate some of the issues in interpreting contextu-
alized formulas. Then a model framework is defined, with clauses for interpreting every
formula of the language. A deductive system of axiom schemas and rules of inference
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is given, with proofs of decidability, soundness, and completeness. Finally, some further
properties of the logic are given, and some other work in this area is discussed.
2. Formula language
The formula language is defined by a Backus–Naur grammar clause. The bases for the
definition are a set A of atomic formulas, and a set C of context names, both of which are
assumed to be enumerably infinite.
Definition 2.1 (The language Σ).
Σ ::=A|¬Σ|Σ →Σ|C −◦Σ|Σ −◦Σ
Additional connectives ↔, ∧, ∨ etc., and the constants  and ⊥, can be added to the
language in the usual way.
Our formulas c −◦ φ are comparable to ist(c,φ) of [2], but where there is first-order
quantification over c in [2], we have instead formulas ψ −◦ φ, the semantics of which will
be defined by quantification over a set of modalities {d −◦ φ}, depending on ψ .
3. Examples
3.1. Nested contexts
Recall the story of King Lear, who makes the fateful mistake of disowning his only
loving and loyal daughter, entrusting his kingdom to his two other daughters. But they are
greedy and selfish, and disaster unfolds. Let ψ be the formula “he is happy”.
the play−◦ (the family−◦¬ψ)
The play is usually cast with actors who are quite rational in their personal lives: Imag-
ine such an actor, a devastating Lear on stage, but privately a considerate and sensible
father. Therefore,
the family−◦ψ
unless some mishap temporarily interferes:
the family−◦ (some mishap−◦¬ψ)
Of course, if a relative visits him at home, and compliments the actor on his performance
as King Lear, this makes him happy:
the family−◦ (the play−◦ψ)
We are concerned that the pattern of surrounding contexts should have bearing on the
interpretation of embedded formulas. Some previously proposed logics of context only
took account of the innermost context in formulas such as the above [2].
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3.2. Contexts described by formulasContext can also be indirectly given by formulas, which then describe the set of contexts
where they are true. Consider the following example from the early formal treatment of
counterfactual conditionals given in [11]: “If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple
over”.
Writing κ for “kangaroos have no tails”, and τ for “kangaroos topple over”, this be-
comes
κ −◦ τ
and our semantical account of it interprets it to be true in circumstances such that all con-
texts where kangaroos have no tails, are contexts where kangaroos topple over. The models
employ a possible-worlds framework to make precise the phrase “circumstances such that”.
3.3. Incremental context
Context can be perceived as an incremental construction, and reconstructing a coherent
context from fragmented information is sometimes necessary. Understanding anaphoric
references is a case in point. Consider for example a visitor to one of London’s prestigious
old university colleges, who is trying his best to find his way to a colleague’s office through
a confusing maze of underground corridors between various college buildings.
He entered the underground passage, and the lights went out. He swore profusely as he
hit his forehead on something. When the lights came back on, he found her office where
he had left it two days earlier. The bandaids were underneath the computer manuals.
A benevolent reader will be prone to ‘fill in the gaps’ in the above paragraph by bringing
to bear contextual knowledge and assumptions consistent with the rest of the tale. ‘The
bandaids’ acquire relevance by assimilation of a ‘hitting of forehead’-context, although
their mention is not preceded by any explicitly defining occurrence. This necessitates a
contextual reconstruction based on the preceding narrative, as well as other sources, for
understanding. [10] presents a technique for building a tree structure of contextual infor-
mation from text, for use in resolving anaphoric references.
In the semantical framework that follows, there is a function which augments a current
state of affairs, say w, with a contextual component c, to form a new state of affairs w  c.
This represents incremental assimilation of contextual information into the current state of
affairs.
4. Model framework
As indicated above, we are concerned with the ability to interpret formulas in circum-
stances which are influenced by context, and where current circumstances are augmented
when new contextual information arrives. States of affairs change as context is assimilated,
they may change again by the addition of more context, and so on.
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This leads to a reflection about what it is to be a state of affairs, or a possible world, in
our framework: Let us dispense for a moment with any preconception of an original state
of affairs from which later states develop, or a final state of affairs towards which previous
states are headed, and try to fend exclusively with the sequential assimilation of new bits
of contextual information. In that case, all that a state of affairs has to identify it, is the
sequence of contexts that has led up to it. If so minded, we may well speak of a possible
world w and how it changes to w  c when context c is assimilated, while remaining ready
to identify w with a sequence c¯ of assimilated contexts. In fact, at several places in the
following sections, that is going to be very convenient indeed.
The truth value of a formula will be evaluated at each of a set of points, or possible
worlds, in each model. A possible world gives a coherent interpretation of the propositional
language fragment, and the worlds are related in a way that determines the interpretation
of −◦ formulas.
The interpretation of a formula c−◦φ at a point w depends on the interpretation of φ at
another point, which is related to w and c.
Each point is related to an enumerable set of other points, one per context. Formulas of
the form φ −◦ψ are interpreted at a point by interpreting φ→ ψ at all related points.
Formally, a model in this framework is a triple M = 〈W,,V 〉, where
• W = ∅ is the set of possible worlds,
•  :W ×C→W , and
• V :W ×A→ 2.
The  component imposes a directed graph on W , with an edge from w to wc for each
w ∈W and c ∈C. Paths in the graph correspond to sequences of nested contexts.
Whenever c¯ is a finite sequence 〈c1, . . . , ck〉 of contexts, c¯ −◦ φ is an abbreviation for
c1 −◦ · · · −◦ ck −◦ φ, and w  c¯ is an abbreviation for w  c1  · · ·  ck . When c¯ is empty,
c¯−◦ φ and w  c¯ are just φ and w.
Definition 4.1 (Interpretation). The truth value of a formula φ at a point w ∈W in a model
M is denoted M,w |= φ, and defined by the following clauses, where a ∈ A, c ∈ C, and
φ,ψ ∈Σ :
M,w |= a iff V (w,a)
M,w |= ¬ψ iff M,w /|=ψ
M,w |= φ→ ψ iff M,w |= φ implies M,w |=ψ
M,w |= c−◦ψ iff M,w  c |=ψ
M,w |= φ −◦ψ iff M,w |= c−◦ (φ→ψ)
for all c ∈ C.
The symbol −◦ is doing the work of two here, corresponding to the last two semantical
clauses, but it will always be syntactically unambiguous which one is intended.
R. Nossum / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 119–133 123
Definition 4.2 (Satisfaction). We say that a model M = 〈W,,V 〉 satisfies a formula φ,
denoted M |= φ, iff M,w |= φ for all w ∈W .
Definition 4.3 (Validity). Truth of a formula φ at all points in all models is denoted |= φ,
and we then say that φ is valid.
Every atomic formula a ∈A is interpreted as a proposition which is either true or false,
and the connectives ¬ and → are interpreted classically. Therefore, all substitution in-
stances of propositional tautologies are valid in this class of models.
5. Deductive system
The deductive system consists of axiom schemas and rules of inference. A finite non-
empty sequence σ¯ = 〈σ1, . . . , σk〉 of formulas is a derivation of σk iff each element of σ¯
either is an axiom or follows from previous elements of σ¯ by a rule of inference.
A formula φ is a theorem, in symbols  φ, iff there exists a derivation of φ.
These are the axiom schemas and rules of inference:
A1 All instances of propositional tautologies.
A2 (c−◦¬φ)↔¬(c−◦ φ)
A3 (c−◦ (φ→ψ))→ ((c−◦ φ)→ (c−◦ψ))
A4 (φ −◦ψ)→ (c−◦ (φ→ ψ))
R1  φ, φ→ψ ψ
R2  φ c−◦ φ
R3  φ→ (c¯−◦ (c−◦ (ψ → χ))) φ→ (c¯−◦ (ψ −◦ χ))
if c does not occur in φ.
Let us briefly comment on each schema and rule. Schema A1 and rule R1 root the
system in propositional logic, andA2 constrains the set of formulas true in each context to
be propositionally coherent. Schema A3 and rule R2 are reminiscent of K and RN from
normal modal logic, cfr. [4]. Schema A4 and rule R3 are similar in spirit to universal
instantiation, resp. universal generalisation, as found in texts on quantified modal logic,
e.g., [9].
Definition 5.1 (Decidability). A deductive system is said to be decidable iff there is an
effective procedure for deciding membership in its set of theorems.
When an axiomatic system with finitely many axioms and rules of inference has the
finite model property, i.e., every formula which is satisfied by all finite models is valid,
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then theoremhood can be decided by a procedure which alternately enumerates derivations
and finite models. Given a formula, eventually either it will pop up as a theorem or its
negation will be satisfied in a finite model. This procedure is effective, since satisfaction
can be recursively calculated in finite models.
Because our deductive system is finite, we only have to prove the finite model property
in the proof of decidability below.
Definition 5.2 (Soundness). An axiom is sound with respect to a model framework iff it is
valid, and a rule of inference is sound if it maps valid premises to valid conclusions.
If all axioms and rules are sound, the whole system is said to be sound, and then
 φ implies |= φ
for all formulas φ.
Definition 5.3 (Consistency). A formula φ is consistent iff /¬φ.
A finite set of formulas is said to be consistent iff the conjunction of its members is
consistent, and an infinite set is consistent iff all its finite subsets are consistent.
A formula φ is consistent with a set Γ according to the consistency of Γ ∪{φ}. Clearly,
when Γ is a consistent set, φ is consistent with Γ iff ¬φ is inconsistent with Γ .
Definition 5.4 (Maximality). A consistent set Γ is maximal iff, for all formulas φ, consis-
tency of Γ ∪ {φ} implies φ ∈ Γ .
For a treatment of maximal consistent sets and their properties, consult, e.g., [4].
Definition 5.5 (Completeness). If every valid formula is a theorem;
|= φ implies  φ
then the system is said to be complete.
The definitions of interpretation, satisfaction and validity are not extended to sets of
formulas, in particular not to infinite sets. Thus the present notion of completeness can be
rephrased as “every consistent formula is true at some point in some model”, but this does
not carry over to infinite sets of formulas.
We now proceed to prove decidability, soundness, and completeness of this axiomatic
presentation of the logic.
6. Decidability proof
Since we have finitely many schemas and rules, it is sufficient to show that every formula
satisfied by all finite models is valid. In the proof it is convenient to rephrase this condition
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into an equivalent form: Every formula true at some world in a model, is true at some world
in a finite model.
So, let us take an arbitrary formulaφ for which there is a modelM = 〈WM,M,VM〉 and
a w ∈WM such that M,w |= φ, and construct a model F = 〈WF ,F ,VF 〉 with finite WF ,
such that F,u |= φ for some u ∈WF .
The possible worlds WF will be a subset of WM , constructed during a process which
scans through all the subformulas of φ. At the start, WF is empty, and for every subformula,
at most one possible world from WM is included into WF . Thus, WF will remain finite
throughout the procedure even though WM may be infinite.
The world u ∈WF which will validate φ in the constructed finite model F is w itself,
and w is included into WF at the first step of the procedure.
The order of traversal of φ corresponds to the natural order of semantical interpretation,
and proceeds analogously to the way in which one would apply the semantical clauses to
evaluate M,w |= φ.
Each subformula is interpreted at a possible world, or in the case of ψ −◦χ formulas, a
set of possible worlds. In either case, no more than a single world from WM is incorporated
into WF for each subformula of φ.
During this traversal we also construct part of F , and build a relation ♥ between el-
ements of WF and subformulas of φ. This relation keeps track of which subformulas are
interpreted at which worlds during traversal.
The traversal procedure can be denoted P(w,φ) and defined recursively as follows,
letting WF = {w} and ♥= ∅ initially.
P(w,φ): First add w ♥ φ, then proceed by cases:
φ ∈A: Define w F c to be w for all c ∈C.
φ =¬ψ : Proceed with P(w,ψ).
φ =ψ → χ : Proceed with P(w,ψ) and P(w,χ).
φ = c−◦ψ : Include w M c into WF , and define w F c to be w M c. Proceed with
P(w F c,ψ).
φ =ψ −◦ χ : If M,w |= φ then choose a c ∈ C such that M,w M c |= ψ → χ , oth-
erwise choose a c ∈ C such that M,w M c /|=ψ → χ . Include w M c
into WF . Define w F c to be w M c. Proceed with P(w F c,ψ → χ).
Observe that with every invocation of P(u,η) on some world u ∈WM and some sub-
formula η of φ, u has already been included in WF , and u♥η is established immediately
by P .
Clearly, WF as constructed here is finite, since at most one world is added per subfor-
mula of φ.
It remains to define VF , and to define w F c for remaining pairs w,c. The former is
simply VM restricted to WF ×A. For the latter, observe that for all w ∈WF there is some
c ∈ C for which w F c was defined by P . Given w, pick one of these c, and let w F d =
w F c whenever w F d was left undefined by P . This completes the construction of F .
Lemma 6.1. F,u |= η iff M,u |= η, whenever u ♥ η.
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Proof. By induction on the syntactical structure of η:η ∈A: Immediate since VF (u,η)= VM(u,η).
η=¬ψ : By the induction hypothesis applied to the syntactically simpler formula ψ .
η=ψ → χ : Ditto for ψ and χ .
η= c−◦ψ : We have u F c = u M c from the corresponding clause in the defini-
tion of P so F,u |= η iff (by semantics) F,u F c |= ψ iff (by induction)
M,u F c |=ψ iff (as remarked)M,uM c |=ψ iff (by semantics)M,u |= η.
η=ψ −◦ χ : If M,u |= η, then for all c ∈C we have M,uM c |=ψ → χ , in particular for
all c such that uM c were included in WF , and F,u |= η follows. Otherwise
some c ∈ C was selected so that u M c ∈WF and M,u M c /|=ψ → χ . It
follows that F,u F c /|=ψ → χ , and hence F,u /|=η as required. ✷
Lemma 6.2. F,w |= φ.
Proof. Follows from the previous lemma, since M,w |= φ and w ♥ φ. ✷
This completes the proof of decidability.
7. Soundness proof
We prove soundness of A4 and R3 as examples. The other axiom schemas and rules
are no more complicated.
A4 We fix some arbitrary model M = 〈W,,V 〉, and show that A4 is true at all w ∈
W : assuming the antecedent of the implication true: M,w |= φ −◦ψ , we must prove
its consequent true for the same M and w: M,w |= c −◦ (φ → ψ). But from the
assumption we get: M,w |= c−◦ (φ→ψ) for every c ∈C, which is sufficient.
R3 Taking the premise of the rule as valid in all models: M,w |= φ → (c¯ −◦ (c −◦
(ψ → χ))) for every model M = 〈WM,M,VM〉 and every w ∈WM , we prove that
the conclusion of the rule is valid in any model N = 〈WN,N,VN 〉, in other words
N,u |= φ→ (c¯−◦ (ψ −◦ χ)) for every u ∈WN .
Choose an arbitrary N and a world u ∈ WN such that N,u |= φ, to prove N,u |=
(c¯ −◦ (ψ −◦ χ)). Now we take an arbitrary context d ∈ C, and prove N, t N d |=
ψ → χ with t = u N c¯.
To this end, we construct a special model M from N as follows: its domain is C∗, the
set of finite sequences of contexts, including the empty sequence ε. Intuitively, such a
sequence points out a world in WN , reachable from u by repeated application of N .
Distinct paths from u reaching the same world in WN count as distinct worlds in WM .
The crucial difference between N and M is in the interpretation at u, resp. ε, of for-
mulas of the form c¯−◦ (c−◦ · · ·) with c¯ and c as fixed above. Here are the definitions
of M = 〈WM,M,VM〉:
WM = C∗
w M e=we for arbitrary w and e, except c¯ M c= c¯d
VM(w,a)= VN(u N w,a)
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We have M,ε |= φ since N,u |= φ and c does not occur in φ. By the premise
of R3, i.e., M |= φ → (c¯ −◦ (c −◦ (ψ → χ))), and application of R1, we ob-
tain M,ε |= c¯ −◦ (c −◦ (ψ → χ)). By the model conditions this is equivalent to
M, c¯ M c |= ψ → χ , and by the construction of M it follows that N, t N d |=
ψ → χ , as required.
8. Completeness proof
As already remarked, completeness is equivalent to truth of every consistent formula δ
at some point in some model. The proof uses a special model M constructed from δ, in
which the possible worlds are maximal consistent sets of formulas, and where a certain
possible world w0, which contains δ, also validates δ. This proof plan is an adaptation of a
technique invented by [8] for first-order predicate calculus.
We take an arbitrary consistent formula δ ∈Σ , and construct a model M = 〈W,,V 〉
such that M,w |= δ for a particular w ∈W :
• W = {w0} ∪ {w  c |w ∈W,c ∈ C}, where w0 is a certain set of formulas, containing
δ and constructed as described below,
• w  c= {φ | c−◦ φ ∈w},
• and V (w,a) iff a ∈w.
The construction of w0 proceeds in steps as follows. We start with the set {δ}, and
traverse the whole of Σ , including more formulas as we go: Σ is clearly enumerable
since A and C are, so we fix some enumeration Σ = 〈σ1, σ2, . . .〉. Now we consider each
σi in turn, and if σi is consistent with w0, then we add σi to w0. If furthermore σi is of
the form (c¯−◦¬(ψ −◦ χ)), then we also add (c¯−◦¬(c′ −◦ (ψ → χ))) to w0, where c′ is
chosen as a member of C that does not occur in any member of w0. Since at each stage of
the process w0 is finite, while C is enumerably infinite, this is always feasible.
Lemma 8.1. w0 is a maximal consistent set.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of steps in the construction of w0. It is
consistent to begin with, and we show that each addition to it preserves consistency. It fol-
lows that every finite subset of w0 will be consistent, therefore w0 itself will be consistent
too. Also it will be maximal, for suppose that w0 ∪{σi} is consistent for some σi ∈Σ , then
σi ∈w0, since it was added in step i of the process.
Addition of σi in the ith step is only done if it preserves consistency, so it remains to
show that, after adding (c¯−◦¬(ψ −◦χ)) consistently, adding (c¯−◦¬(c′ −◦ (ψ → χ))) to
w0 also preserves consistency.
To see this, suppose for contradiction that (c¯ −◦ ¬(c′ −◦ (ψ → χ))) is inconsistent
with w0, in other words,
¬(φ ∧ (c¯−◦¬(c′ −◦ (ψ → χ))))
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where φ is the (finite) conjunction of members of w0 after adding σi consistently. Equiva-
lently
 φ→¬(c¯−◦¬(c′ −◦ (ψ → χ)))
or, by repeated application of A2,
 φ→ (c¯−◦ (c′ −◦ (ψ → χ)))
But then by R3:
 φ→ (c¯−◦ (ψ −◦ χ))
since c′ is chosen so as to not occur in φ. By repeatedly applying A2 again, we get
 φ→¬(c¯−◦¬(ψ −◦ χ))
or equivalently
¬(φ ∧ (c¯−◦¬(ψ −◦ χ)))
But this contradicts the consistency of σi with w0, so it follows that the consistency of w0
is preserved at every step of its construction process. ✷
Lemma 8.2. w  c is a maximal consistent set whenever w is.
Proof. The following three parts are sufficient, cfr. [4]:
• w  c contains all theorems: Suppose  φ. Then  c−◦ φ by R2, so c−◦ φ ∈w since
w is a maximal consistent set. Then it follows that φ ∈w  c by the definition of .
• w  c separates formulas from their negations, i.e., φ /∈w  c iff ¬φ ∈w  c:
Expanding the definition of the former we obtain: (c−◦ φ) /∈w which is equivalent to
¬(c−◦ φ) ∈w by the fact that w is maximal and consistent. By A2 this is equivalent
to c−◦¬φ ∈w, which again by definition of  is equivalent to ¬φ ∈w  c.
• w  c is propositionally closed, i.e., if φ ∈w  c and φ→ ψ ∈w  c then ψ ∈w  c:
Suppose φ ∈ w  c, i.e., by definition c −◦ φ ∈ w, and suppose also φ → ψ ∈ w  c,
which develops into (c −◦ (φ → ψ)) ∈ w. We must show ψ ∈ w  c, which means
c−◦ψ ∈w. But this follows from A3 and the fact that w is a maximal consistent set.
Therefore the set w  c is maximal and consistent whenever w is. By induction on the
length of paths in W starting at w0, the previous two lemmas prove that all w ∈ W are
maximal consistent sets. ✷
Lemma 8.3. M,w |= φ iff φ ∈w.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the syntactical structure of the formulas.
• The atomic case follows from the definition of V .
• ¬φ: M,w |= ¬φ iff, by definition, M,w /|=φ iff, by induction, φ /∈ w, iff, since w is
maximal consistent, ¬φ ∈w.
R. Nossum / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 119–133 129
• φ → ψ : M,w |= φ → ψ iff, by definition, M,w |= φ implies M,w |= ψ , iff, by in-
duction, φ ∈w implies ψ ∈w, iff, since w is maximal consistent, φ→ ψ ∈w.
• c −◦ χ : By definition, M,w |= c −◦ χ iff M,w  c |= χ , equivalent by induction to
χ ∈w  c, which by definition of  is equivalent to: c−◦ χ ∈w.
• φ−◦ψ : By definition, M,w |= φ−◦ψ iff for every c ∈C, M,w |= c−◦ (φ→ψ). By
induction, this is equivalent to: c−◦ (φ→ψ) ∈w for every c ∈ C.
Now suppose that φ−◦ψ ∈w. Then, byA4 and the fact that w is a maximal consistent
set, c−◦ (φ→ ψ) ∈w for any c, which is equivalent to M,w |= φ −◦ψ .
But if, on the contrary, (φ−◦ψ) /∈w, then since w is a maximal consistent set, ¬(φ−◦
ψ) ∈w. By construction of the model,
– w=w0  c¯ for some sequence c¯ of contexts,
– c¯−◦¬(φ −◦ψ) ∈w0,
– c¯−◦¬(c′ −◦ (φ→ ψ)) ∈w0 for some select c′.
It follows that ¬(c′ −◦ (φ → ψ)) ∈ w, which as remarked above is equivalent to
M,w /|= (φ −◦ψ).
This completes the proof of the lemma. ✷
Lemma 8.4. M,w0 |= δ.
Proof. This is now obvious, since δ ∈w0. ✷
Since every consistent formula is true somewhere, the logic is complete for our class of
models.
9. Further properties of the logic
We survey a few additional properties of the logic, in the form of sound axiom schemas
and rules of inference.
In view of completeness, the soundness of each of these schemas and rules is sufficient
to show that they are derivable in the axiomatic system. Soundness is straightforward to
verify every case, so we omit the proofs.
A5 (φ→ψ)→ ((ψ −◦ χ)→ (φ −◦ χ))
A6 (φ→ψ)→ ((x −◦ φ)→ (x −◦ψ)) for x ∈ C or x ∈Σ .
We see that −◦ is antitone in its first coordinate and monotone in its second one. This
is intuitively pleasing, and admits a possible reading of the binary modality −◦ as a
kind of conditional, although this was not the main motivation for its definition.
A7 (φ −◦ φ)
A8 (x −◦ φ)→ ((φ −◦ψ)→ (x −◦ψ)), for x ∈ C or x ∈Σ .
This shows that −◦ is a partial preorder on Σ , again in keeping with a reading of −◦
as a conditional symbol.
A9 (−◦ φ)→ (c−◦ φ)
The least specific description of a context is , which describes every context by
virtue of being true no matter what.
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A10 ¬(−◦¬φ)→ ((φ −◦¬ψ)↔¬(φ −◦ψ))
This comes close to mimicking A2 for φ −◦ψ , and can be intuitively understood to
say that every non-contradictory formula describes some contexts.Whenever φ is not
false in every context, then whatever is false in the contexts described by φ, is not
true there. The restriction on φ is to avoid empty quantification.
A11 ((c−◦ φ)∧ (c−◦ψ))↔ (c−◦ (φ ∧ψ))
This and other analogous rigidity principles apply to the classical connectives. Intu-
itively, they are aspects of the propositional coherence of the set of formulas true in
each context.
A12 (x −◦ (φ→ ψ))→ ((x −◦ φ)→ (x −◦ψ)) for x ∈C or x ∈Σ .
When an implication is true in every member of a set of contexts, and the antecedent
is true in every member, then the consequent is also true in every member. An easy
generalization over A3, admitting formulas in the first coordinate of −◦.
A13 (φ −◦ψ)↔ (−◦ (φ→ ψ))
This conversion principle corresponds closely to the semantical clause for φ −◦ ψ .
Intuitively,  is the least specific description, and thus describes every context.
Therefore, every subformula−◦ · · · corresponds to a quantifier spanning the whole
set C of contexts.
R4  φ↔ψ (φ −◦ χ)↔ (ψ −◦ χ)
R5  ∧φi →ψ ∧(x −◦ φi)→ (x −◦ψ) for x ∈ C or x ∈Σ .
These two rules show that, in the terminology of [4], if we look at −◦ as a binary
modality, it is classical in its first coordinate and normal in its second one. It shares
these properties with the class of conditional logics investigated there, and for which
the model framework was a class of minimal models. We feel that the present class
of models is simpler and more intuitive.
R6  φ x −◦ φ for x ∈C or x ∈Σ .
Every theorem is true in every context described by any formula. This is highly in-
tuitive, and is a generalization over R2, admitting formulas in the first coordinate
of −◦.
R7  φ→ ψ φ −◦ψ
Constrains the phrase “described by” in the informal reading of φ −◦ ψ . What is
implied logically by φ, must also be true in the contexts described by φ.
10. Comparison with other logics of context
The propositional logic of ist(c,ψ) is investigated in [3], and augmented with first-
order quantification in [2]. These are axiomatic systems for reasoning with ist-formulas
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asserted in given contexts. The syntax for asserting φ in context c is c :φ, and a central
motivation for these logics is the ability to enter a given context, perform some reasoning
there according to facts that hold in that context, and exit with the results so obtained. In
general, this gives rise to a stack c¯ of contexts having been entered into and not exited
from, and these are the deduction rules governing entry into and exit from contexts:
Enter:
 c¯ : ist(c,ψ)
 c¯c :ψ Exit:
 c¯c :ψ
 c¯ : ist(c,ψ)
The Enter rule is not listed in the axiomatic presentation of [3], and it is subsumed by other
axioms and rules of the logic. It is included here for symmetry.
The semantics of [2] does not distinguish between ist(c, ist(d,φ)) and ist(d,φ), which
appears anomalous at first blush. The rules for entering and exiting contexts are corre-
spondingly constrained:
Enter:
 x : ist(c,ψ)
 c :ψ Exit:
 c :ψ
 x : ist(c,ψ)
The logic remembers only the last context that has been entered into. This phenomenon,
called flatness, is not unavoidable however, and as discussed below, [14] generalizes the
propositional logic of ist(c,φ) to an algebraically generated spectrum of context logics
where flat contexts are only a special case.
We may compare our
φ −◦ψ
with
∀c : ist(c,φ→ψ)
of [2]. The latter formula can be taken as rephrasing our semantical clause for the former.
If the two are accepted as variants of each other, then Buvacˇ’s system is seen to be strictly
more expressive than the one presented here, because it has full first-order quantification,
over context variables as well as other variables. But as usual expressivity comes at a price:
the system of [2] is not decidable.
To further illuminate the trade-off that afforded us decidability in the present logic, let
us point out our axiom A2, which may be taken to express that each individual context is
a logically coherent and complete entity. That is a stricter assumption than in most other
logics of context, including other logics studied by this author [5,14,15].
van Benthem [1] finds that the term ‘context’ denotes a convenient methodological
fiction, rather than a well-defined ontological category. His proposal is for an indexing
scheme, where each language element can be decorated with an index specifying an in-
tended context for evaluation. This results in a logic where transition between contexts has
a natural expression.
Giunchiglia, Serafini et al. have also developed logical systems of context where tran-
sition between contexts is the main concern [17]. Each context is modelled by a separate
natural deductive system, and there are special rules for inter-context deduction. However,
there is no direct provision for nesting of contexts, as in ist(c, ist(d,φ)), although the nat-
ural deduction system allows for convenient passage between c and d .
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Nossum and Serafini have developed natural-deductive systems of context where con-
text combination is catered for through an algebraic component [15]. Sequential compo-
sition of contexts, e.g., c, d, e, . . . , is represented associatively by algebraic terms, e.g.,
c ⊕ d ⊕ e . . ., and there is provision for algebraic equations on context terms, thus span-
ning a variety of natural-deductive logics of context including flat contexts, context sets,
context multisets, and context sequences.
[14] expands on the idea of algebraic context augmentation in the framework of an ax-
iomatic ist-logic in the style of [3]. This time, context terms like c⊕ d ⊕ e are introduced
into the syntax of the language, as are algebraic equations on ground context terms. The
equational varieties within the scope of this approach are the same as in [15], including
flat contexts, context sets, context multisets, and context sequences. Augmenting a con-
text w with another one, c, to form a composite context w ⊕ c, is analogous to going
from possible world w to possible world w  c in the logic of the present paper. Ongoing
work aims to generalize [14] to wider equational varieties and quasi-varieties, as well as to
quantificational logic.
In [5] a quantificational system similar to Buvacˇ’s is obtained by self fibring of predicate
logics, and decidability is shown in a special case. The multi-modal logic for ist(φ,ψ)
given in [5] is as expressive as the present logic for φ −◦ψ , but no decidability results are
given.
11. Conclusion
We depart from the notation ist(c,ψ) which originates with [7], preferring c−◦ψ and
generalizing to φ−◦ψ . Our system harnesses generalization over contexts in a two-layered
multi-modal system, the semantics of one modality quantifying over a set of simpler
modalities. This results in a simple, decidable, sound, and complete axiomatic presenta-
tion.
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